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Abstract
In a scenario where hotspot wireless networks are increasingly being
used, and given the amount of sensitive information exchanged on Internet
interactions, there is the need to implement security mechanisms that
guarantee data confidentiality and integrity in such networks, as well as
the authenticity of the hotspot providers.
However, many hotspots today use Captive Portals, which rely on au-
thentication through Web pages (thus, an application-level authentication
approach) instead of a link-layer approach. The consequence of this is that
there is no security in the wireless link to the hotspot (it has to be pro-
vided at upper protocol layers), and is cumbersome to manage wireless
access profiles (we need special applications or browsers’ add-ons to do
that).
This work exposes the weaknesses of the Captive Portals’ paradigm,
which does not follow a unique nor standard approach, and describes a
solution that intends to suppress them, based on the 802.1X architec-
ture. This solution uses a new EAP-compliant protocol that is able to
integrate an HTTP-based registration or authentication with a Captive
Portal within the 802.1X authentication framework.
Keywords: Wireless networks, 802.11, hotspots, Captive Portals, link-
layer security, 802.1X, EAP, TLS
1 Introduction
The security of 802.11 (Wi-Fi) wireless networks is defined by several standards,
such as 802.11i [28] and 802.11w [29]. These standards define a wide range of
security mechanisms, including mutual authentication between a user and a
network provider and link-layer data encryption and frame integrity control.
Furthermore, these standards also open the path to evolution, namely to the
development of new, innovative authentication protocols. This is achieved with
the adoption of the 802.1X authentication architecture [30], which allows dif-
ferent EAP (Extensible Authentication Protocol [1]) compliant authentication
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protocols to be defined and deployed for tackling special requirements [9]. A
common characteristic of all these protocols is that all of them produce a se-
cret, shared session key that will be used by 802.11i and 802.11w protection
mechanisms to provide an effective security at the link layer.
One of the limitations of the actual, standard 802.11 security paradigm is
that it does not support the enrollment of new users by a network. In fact, it
supports the protection of users that already share some access credentials with
the network provider, but not the setup of those credentials. This is a notorious
limitation, since in many cases users could benefit of using a Wi-Fi network that
is provided where they are, but they need first to enroll in that network using
some sort of alternative communication channel.
Captive Portals did the trick, and because of that, they became very popular
to deploy the so-called Wi-Fi hotspots. With Captive Portals, the users may
enroll on network providers using a Web browser and the network of interest,
and then use the same Captive Portal to authenticate themselves prior to use
the network. Recently Cisco forecast in a White Paper [6] that ”the total public
Wi-Fi hotspots (including homespots) will grow four-fold from 2017 to 2022”,
which means that the exploitation of Captive Portals will continue to grow.
However, the exploitation of Captive Portals has several drawbacks. First,
they are implemented today as an ad hoc, Web-based Man-in-the-Middle
(MitM) hack that causes confusion in client systems and users [25, 46, 47].
Second, the Captive Portals’ authentication is performed at the applicational
level, and thus does not produces key material for being used by 802.11i and
802.11w. Therefore, users accessing Wi-Fi networks controlled by Captive Por-
tals are not protected at the link layer. The consequence is that both users and
access networks can be easily attacked and abused in many different ways, which
we will detail later (see Section 3). Therefore, they are dangerous when it comes
to the transmission of sensitive information, as alerted by several non-technical
online publications [10, 45, 36].
1.1 Contribution
In this paper, we propose an alternative to the actual Captive Portals. Our
alternative keeps their benefit (enrollment of new users with a Web service)
while exploring the existing Wi-Fi security mechanisms defined in 802.11i and
802.11w. This alternative explores a new EAP protocol, nicknamed EAP-SH
(EAP for Secure Hotspots) and relies on modified end-entities that manage the
802.1X authentication endpoints (thus, the ones that will deal with EAP-SH).
To explore EAP-SH, users may create Wi-Fi access profiles, just as they usually
do with their home or work Wi-Fi networks, to enforce the interaction with the
correct hotspots along time.
EAP-SH actually combines two kinds of authentications: an arbitrary au-
thentication within a Captive Portal (usually password-based) and a certificate-
based authentication, using asymmetric key pairs and public key certificates.
This last method facilitates user authentications, as it enables users to authen-
ticate many times during a configurable time span (the lifetime of certificates)
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without providing any input after a successful Captive Portal authentication.
For dealing with HTTP-based interactions with Captive Portals, EAP-SH
creates a TLS (Transport Layer Security [34]) tunnel over EAP for transferring
HTTP messages between a user browser and the Captive Portal’s Web server.
This tunnel allows the user browser to interact with a Captive Portal Web
service before the user host having an IP address (the IP configuration will only
take place after succeeding in the 802.1X authentication protocol).
We implemented a prototype of EAP-SH in two open-source Linux applica-
tions that implement the 802.1X EAP endpoints: wpa supplicant and freeRA-
DIUS. Our prototype implementation was then successfully tested on a real
setup with a very simple, password-based Captive Portal.
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the technical foun-
dations of the 802.1X authentication. Section 3 presents the security issues
raised by the lack of link security in hotspot networks controlled by a Captive
Portal. Section 4 presents some related work. Section 5 presents our EAP pro-
tocol (EAP-SH) and discusses some alternative exploitation scenarios. Section 6
describes an implementation of EAP-SH and its experimentation with a very
simple Captive Portal. Section 7 compares the performance of EAP-SH with
similar solutions. Section 8 discusses the security of EAP-SH and compares it
with the security-flawed Captive Portal solutions. Finally, Section 9 presents
the conclusions and foresees future work.
2 Technical Foundations
The 802.11i standard [28] defines the foundations for most of the security
mechanism used in 802.11 wireless networks. Other standards exists, such as
802.11w [29], which is also related with 802.11i, for complementing the security
for 802.11 networks.
802.11i uses the 802.1X authentication architecture [30] for performing mu-
tual authentication on the access of a mobile host to a wireless network. The
802.1X architecture comprises a Supplicant (the mobile host), an Authenticator
(an Access Point, AP) and an Authentication Server (AS), typically imple-
mented by a RADIUS server [35]. This is commonly referred as an enterprise
architecture, because it is more suitable for networks with a large amount of
users. In some environments, usually referred as SOHO (Small Office, Home
Office), the architecture can be simplified and the AS is not used; this is not
our case.
The 802.1X enterprise authentication process has three phases, graphically
displayed in Figure 1.
In the first phase, the Supplicant performs a useless network authentication
(Open System Authentication) just for fulfilling a mandatory state-machine step
inherited from WEP (Wired Equivalent Privacy), the 802.11i predecessor, and
requests its association to the AP.
Then, we have the second phase, in which the Supplicant engages on a mutual
authentication process with the AS. This process is not fixed; many authentica-
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Figure 1: 802.1X authentication architecture: entities and phases. EAPoL
stands for EAP over LAN and MSK stands for Master Session Key
tion protocols can be used. However, they are all encapsulated on EAP [1]. The
reason for using the EAP encapsulation is to allow the Authenticator to recog-
nize the messages exchanged in this phase, which need to be relayed back and
forth between the Supplicant and the AS. There are many EAP authentication
protocols [9]; among them, we have EAP-TLS and the one that we propose in
this paper, EAP-SH.
EAP-TLS [41] is fundamentally the establishment of a TLS [34] session with
a mutual authentication being performed with pairs of asymmetric keys and
X.509 public key certificates [7]. EAP-SH is more complex, as it can be used to
enroll a user in a network provider using a Captive Portal, to fetch a certificate
for a Supplicant upon a proper authentication of its user with a Captive Portal,
and then it may work as EAP-TLS with that certificate.
The outcome of all successful EAP authentications is a Master Session Key
(MSK), which is shared between the Supplicant and the AS. The AS uploads
this key to the Authenticator, which uses it to run the third 802.1X phase.
In the third phase, both the Supplicant and the Authenticator derive a PMK
(Pairwise Master Key) from MSK and run the so-called four-way handshake.
The purpose of this phase is to perform a mutual authentication between Sup-
plicant and Authenticator using PMK and to derive a set of shorter-term traffic
protection keys.
These traffic protection keys will subsequently be used to perform the 802.11i
encryption and integrity control of the data frames exchanged between the Sup-
plicant and the Authenticator. The 802.11i frame integrity control assures that
attackers cannot inject false frames to any of the peers, Supplicant of Authen-
ticator, on behalf of the other. Moreover, neither can an attacker replay past
frames. Furthermore, the traffic protection keys will also protect management
frames, namely 802.11 authentication and association frames, according with
the 802.11w standard.
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3 Captive Portals’ security issues
The list below resumes all the security problems raised by the lack of link-layer
security caused by the current exploitation of hotspots with Captive Portals:
• Clients can abuse the network through tunnels [33] over protocols that are
always allowed, such as DNS [27].
• Clients’ traffic is not encrypted at the link layer, and therefore can be
captured in clear text by radio link eavesdroppers. While some traffic is
already encrypted at the application layer, this is not the case for many
Internet protocols;
• Traffic to and from clients does not have any source authentication or
integrity control, and therefore MitM and impersonation attacks can be
performed. An example of such attacks are session hijacking or freeload-
ing [48]. Session hijacking allows an attacker to take control of a session
that is being held by a client host with some other Internet host, while
freeloading allows an attacker to explore network resources on behalf of a
client host (without its knowledge);
• Clients and hosts, together, can be fooled by rogue hotspot APs, which
can interfere with the clients’ activities (e.g. by doing a DNS poisoning
attack [2] or browser history stealing [8]);
The problems listed above are just an example of what can happen when one
uses a hotspot without link-layer security. Without such security, both network
clients and the network itself are open to traffic inspection and injection. This
is a very significant security thread, which currently has no solution, not even
with the mechanisms proposed in WPA3 (see Section 4).
4 Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there are no previous proposals addressing the
security problems created by the current paradigm for implementing Captive
Portals as we did, i.e., by using the security standards developed for Wi-Fi, such
as 802.1X, 802.11i and 802.11w. Nevertheless, we present some other solutions,
addressing the issues raised by Captive Portals and with authentication of users
accessing hotspots.
The Universal Access Method (UAM [17]) is a particular implementation of
the Captive Portal paradigm, providing authentication through a Web browser.
With this solution, the user requests a Web site and the destination IP address of
that packet is shifted to an UAM handler. The UAM handler redirects the user
to the UAM portal (Captive Portal), presenting a form that the user submits.
The UAM handler then contacts a RADIUS server to authenticate the user and
signals the beginning of the session.
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Captive Portals are ordinarily called upon clients’ HTTP requests, using an
HTTP redirection. A new HTTP status code 511 [26] was created to avoid
confusions created by HTTP redirections implemented with other status codes
that were being used to redirect HTTP clients (especially non-browser clients)
to Captive Portals. This solution does not solve any of the security problems
created by the Captive Portals paradigm, only helps to mitigate misinterpre-
tations that can arise from the redirection performed by hotspot APs to force
client machines to be authenticated prior to have access to the network.
Xia and Brustoloni [48] presented a solution for dealing with two security
vulnerabilities created by Captive Portals: session hijacking and freeloading.
Session hijacking is tackled with automatic reauthentications performed by
the client host (more precisely, by its browser), which an attacker cannot do.
Freeloading is tackled by following sequence numbers in frames and detecting
two or more trend lines. However, the net result of both detection mechanisms
is the disconnection of the victim client host from the network. Our solution
simply does not allow session hijacking or freeloading to take place, because it
enables the communication between clients and APs to be properly protected
with 802.11i [28].
Godber and Dasgupta proposed an architecture based on a security gateway
to implement an IPSec [13] tunnel with the clients’ hosts upon a hotspot-based
authentication [15]. This solution solves all security issues but introduces a
performance bottleneck on the security gateway, while our solution uses the
802.11i [28] protection, which distributes the workload of wireless traffic protec-
tion by client hosts and APs.
Wi-Fi hotspots are open for public access, and for that reason they are not
appropriate for exchanging authentication credentials between the clients and
the AP. Some authors proposed that this could be solved by deploying a custom
developed key establishment solution between a client host and an AP using
a hierarchical identity-based cryptography set of methods [5]. As with other
identity-based methods [40], an entity public key is derivable from a known
attribute of the entity (e.g. an email address). The corresponding private key
is generated by a third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG), based
on the entity’s identity. However, this requires the setup of a secure channel
between the entity and the PKG through which it can send the private key,
which is a major disadvantage for scenarios requiring ad hoc contacts. The
MAC address also serves as an identity (i.e., to generate a public/private key
pair), with the drawback of involving all interface manufacturers (thus, raises
scalability issues), and is not retro-compatible (network interfaces need to have
a private key installed). Finally, it raises privacy issues, as the MAC address
cannot be modified for preventing users’ devices from being easily traced.
Hotspot 2.0, also called HS2 or Wi-Fi Certified Passpoint [3], is a standard
for public access Wi-Fi. It is based on 802.11u [31] and features seamless roam-
ing among wireless networks, as well as between Wi-Fi and cellular networks,
increased bandwidth, and services-on-demand to end-users. This means that
when a subscriber’s device is in range of at least one Wi-Fi network, the device
automatically connects to it and network discovery, registration, provisioning
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and access processes are automated. It uses an OSU (Online Sign Up) AP and
OSU server to register future user authentication credentials (asymmetric key
pair and certified public key), which will then be used in Production APs to
authenticate the client with EAP-TLS [41]. This solution is somewhat similar
to ours but it abolishes Captive Portals (while we keep them) and it requires
APs to be modified (while we do not).
Apple’s Captive Network Assistant (CNA) is a user agent (a limited browser)
that automatically pops up and interacts with a Captive Portal when an Apple
host connects to an open Wi-Fi network of a hotspot, instead of waiting for a
browser request. The hotspot detection is based on Apple operating systems
fetching a standard file from Apple servers, which is not served because of the
redirection to the Captive Portal [23]. A similar solution is used by other oper-
ation systems, such as Microsoft Windows (since their Vista version). Similar
assistants exist for other operating systems (e.g. Android), but not all assistants
support all hotspots (since there is not standard approach for implementing
them).
Another alternative to notify network client hosts of the necessity to connect
to a Captive Portal is to provide its URI (Uniform Resource Identifier) within an
optional field of an IPv4 DHCP (Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol) lease
offer or as an extension of an IPv6 Router Advertisement message [19]. This
enables clients to trigger an interaction with the network’s Captive Portal upon
the network configuration phase, instead of waiting for HTTP-based interactions
initiated by the client user. This functionality, however, has no security benefits.
The Wireless Internet Service Provider roaming (WISPr [43, 42]) is a proto-
col chartered by the Wi-Fi Alliance where users are authenticated using UAM.
WISPr authentication is done by smart-clients (small Web browsers) which use
SSL/XML messaging to seamlessly login to hotspots without the need for users
to interact with the Captive Portal. WISPr authentication allows a user to roam
between wireless Internet Service Providers (ISPs), even if the hotspot pertains
to one ISP for which the user may not have an account. For example, if a user
that has an account with ISP X attempts to roam to a hotspot of ISP Y, the
latter forwards the user’s credentials to X’s AAA (Authentication, Authoriza-
tion and Accounting) server for authentication. Once ISP X authenticates the
user, it is automatically authenticated in ISP Y, as per their service agreements.
WISPr facilitates the sharing of hotspots among network providers, but does
not solve any of the security issues previously presented.
WilmaGate [4] is a system for managing a single hotspots access network
with several authenticators (where subscribers are registered). It does not solve
any of the security issues previously referred.
In [21] the authors addressed the problem of getting credentials for users, as
well as the hotspot public key certificate, using an NFC (Near Field Commu-
nication [44]) side-channel. These credentials can then be explored to perform
an ordinary 802.1X authentication and set up a secure communication channel
using the 802.11i security mechanisms. The drawback of this approach is that
users need to have close-range contact with an NFC device to download the cre-
dentials. This approach could be used to complement our solution for providing
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Figure 2: EAP-SH sequence of operations for authenticating a user on client host
with a Captive Portal within a hotspot access network. The arrows represent
one or more messages and show the protocol used in each interaction. The
EAPoL (EAP over LAN) traffic is, in this case, EAP-SH traffic.
users with trustworthy self-certified certificates used by hotspots.
Recently was unveiled WPA3 (Wi-Fi Protected Access 3), an evolution of
Wi-Fi security standards. Among the new features included in WPA3 there
is an Enhanced Open [24] certification, based on Opportunistic Wireless En-
cryption (OWE [16]). OWE provides encryption in the wireless medium but no
authentication, thus it cannot tackle active attacks by rogue APs [16, Section 7].
Furthermore, it does not facilitates the actual authentication with Captive Por-
tals in any way.
5 EAP-SH: Extensible Authentication Protocol
for Secure Hotspots
This section describes our proposal, EAP-SH, which brings together the 802.1X
architecture with the Captive Portal paradigm. EAP-SH allows a client host
(Supplicant) to be redirected to a Captive Portal through EAP, during which
it has no granted IP access to the network. Therefore, no IP-based covert
channels can be created before a successful user authentication (e.g. DNS tun-
neling). Furthermore, by embedding the access to a Captive Portal within EAP,
and within the authentication and authorization processes used in 802.1X, we
can benefit from the key derivation process of 802.1X, which enables the pro-
tection of the communications between a Supplicant and an AP with 802.11i
protocols upon a successful mutual authentication. Finally, this EAP method
was designed to allow a transparent user authentication using previously cached
credentials, instead of relying all the time in a Captive Portal authentication.
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5.1 Protocol overview
Besides the usual entities considered in the 802.1X architecture (Supplicant,
Authenticator and AS), we propose three more (see Figure 2): a browser, a
Captive Portal (a Web server) and a Users’ Certification Authority (UCA).
The browser will run in the same machine of the Supplicant and will sup-
port the interaction with the Captive Portal (within a secure session established
between the Supplicant and the AS). Note, however, that the browser will not
establish a direct TCP connection with the Captive Portal, but with the Suppli-
cant instead. The Captive Portal will receive HTTP messages from an AS, on
behalf of a Supplicant, and will respond only to it. Finally, the UCA is respon-
sible for issuing X.509 certificates for users upon a successful authentication on
the Captive Portal. Those certificates are accepted for user authentication in
the AS, and can be cached.
We assumed that the AS and the Captive Portal share a database with user
profiles and accounting information. Regarding our protocol, the structure of
such database is irrelevant.
Concerning the information shared between the ordinary 802.1X entities and
the new ones, we only need the AS to know the UCA certificate (to get its public
key), in order to validate certificates provided by users’ Supplicants.
EAP-SH has two phases, similarly to other EAP methods [9], such as
PEAP [32] and EAP-TTLS [41]. Those phases, for which high-level protocol
flows are presented in Figure 2, are as follows.
In the 1st phase, there is an attempt to authenticate both Supplicant and
the AS with X.509 public key certificates. The authentication of the AS cannot
fail, while for the Supplicant this can happen. If the mutual authentication
succeeds, EAP-SH terminates successfully.
If the Supplicant authentication could not be performed, the 2nd phase takes
place, where the user is called to perform an HTTP-based authentication with a
Captive Portal. The involved HTTP interaction is relayed by the Supplicant and
the AS, under the protection a TLS secure session established during phase 1.
Upon a successful authentication by the Captive Portal, the Supplicant creates a
Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) and sends it to the UCA, in a communication
relayed by the AS. Then, the UCA creates a user X.509 certificate and sends
it to the Supplicant, again through the AS. Finally, the Supplicant resumes the
protocol from the beginning, in order to perform a new mutual authentication
with X.509 certificates.
For a user, the whole process involving client-side asymmetric credentials,
which are obtained in phase 2 and used in phase 1, is completely transparent.
Users are only called to interact in authentication processes when they have
to interact with the Captive Portal, during the 2nd phase of EAP-SH. Thus,
we keep the Captive Portal paradigm of user registration and we allow users
to authenticate themselves with the well-known username plus password set of
credentials, but we transparently simplify the users’ authentication tasks by
using the temporary asymmetric credentials.
Moreover, users are able to have multiple, simultaneous sessions with sepa-
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Figure 3: EAP-SH flow of messages between the Supplicant and the AS.
rate authentication data, which can be revoked independently.
5.2 EAP message flows of EAP-SH
An EAP authentication is a request-response protocol, where requests require
the consequent reception of a response. Within 802.1X, the initiator of a request-
response dialog is always the AS. The request-response dialog terminates with
either an EAP success or failure message (both without payload and unacknowl-
edged).
The 1st phase, or TLS phase, consists on the establishment of a TLS session
between the Supplicant and the AS within a EAP-TLS protocol, which defines
a mutual authentication of the Supplicant and the AS with asymmetric key
pairs and public key X.509 certificates (see Figure 3). However, in EAP-SH
the Supplicant authentication in this phase is optional, and decided by the
Supplicant, while in EAP-TLS it is mandatory. When the Supplicant certificate
is invalid or non-existent, this phase continues nevertheless, until completing
the setup of the TLS session, and the authentication proceeds to a 2nd phase,
which runs over that secure session.
Therefore, this phase terminates with one of two EAP messages:
• EAP success: this means that the user was properly authenticated during
phase 1, and the EAP authentication, as far as the AS is concerned, is
finished.
• EAP-SH Start: this means that EAP-SH must proceed to the 2nd phase.
The 2nd phase, or the Captive Portal phase, consists on the exchange of
EAP-SH-specific messages encapsulating either HTTP messages, a CSR or a
10
X.509 certificate. This phase is successful if it terminates with the reception of
a certificate by Supplicant, to be posteriorly used in the 1st phase of EAP-SH,
together with the corresponding Supplicant’s private key. Upon its termination,
the AS initiates a new phase 1.
The success of the Captive Portal authentication is signaled to both the AS
and the Supplicant with a custom HTTP header field (X-username) containing
the user identity. Upon receiving it, the Supplicant generates a fresh asymmetric
key pair, uses it to build a CSR [39] for that identity and sends it to the AS.
The so-called “X-” headers have been deprecated by RFC 6648 [37]. This is
not a problem, on the contrary. Since they were deprecated, it is unlikely that
our solution clashes with the use of a similar header field, which is an advantage.
On the other hand, this header field is added by the AS and removed by the
Supplicant, therefore it is never observed outside the EAP-SH.
When the Supplicant receives this certificate, it stores it and re-initiates
the EAP-SH protocol, starting again from phase 1, which will (conceivably)
authenticate the user with their asymmetric credentials, as in EAP-TLS.
Upon a successful mutual authentication of both Supplicant and AS at the
end of phase 1 of EAP-SH, the MSK to be used by both Supplicant and AP to
run the remainder of the 802.1X protocol is generated just like in EAP-TLS.
5.3 EAP messages’ structure
EAP messages have a standard header structure [1], and a variable payload
structure, depending on the specific EAP protocol being used. Therefore, we
have defined our own payload for EAP-SH, which is as follows.
The EAP protocol does not support fragmentation of messages longer than
1020 bytes. Since with EAP-SH we need to transfer possibly longer contents
between a Supplicant and an AS (e.g. certificates, Web pages, etc.), we need to
handle their fragmentation on the EAP-SH level.
Both requests and responses may, in some cases (e.g. when fragmentation is
used), serve as an acknowledgment of the reception of a specific fragment.
We use two payload structures, one for each phase. For phase 1 we did not
need to modify the EAP-TLS payload structure, which we borrowed for our 2nd
phase. For this, the fields of the EAP payload are the following (see Figure 4):
• Flags: 1-byte long set of bit flags. The L bit (length included) is set to
indicate the presence of a message length field in the following bytes. This
is used only on the first fragment of a fragmented message. The M bit
(more fragments) is set to indicate if more fragments are to come; it is
active on all fragments but the last. The H bit is set to indicate that the
EAP-SH payload contains an HTTP request coming from the Supplicant;
for HTTP responses, this bit is set to zero. The C bit is set when the
Supplicant sends its CSR or when the AS sends the Supplicant’s certificate
for a future EAP-SH phase 1. Finally, the S bit (EAP-SH start) is set
when the AS initiates the 2nd phase. Fragment acknowledgments have all
of their flag bits set to zero.
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• Message length: This is is a 4-byte field with the big endian representa-
tion of the total length of a EAP-SH message. This length is only present
on the first fragment of a fragmented EAP-SH message.
• Payload: This field can contain either an HTTP message (request or
response), a Supplicant’s CSR or a Supplicant’s certificate.
Figure 4: Structure of the EAP payload used for the 2nd phases of EAP-SH
(right). This structure was borrowed from the EAP-TLS message structure.
Although presented together, the H and C flags are not used simultaneously;
only one of them, or none, are used at the time.
5.4 Privacy enhancement
EAP-TLS is known for having privacy problems, since it exposes the user iden-
tity in their certificate. Since the 1st phase of EAP-SH is almost identical to
EAP-TLS, we also have that problem, which we attempted to solve.
However, privacy issues go beyond the exposure of identity labels. In fact,
usually 802.11 network devices have a fixed MAC address, which means that,
even concealing more human-related attributes, an attacker can still track de-
vices as they move around. This was a key motivation for MAC address ran-
domization in mobile devices, such as smartphones [20].
The EAP-TLS strategy for dealing with this privacy issue consists in repeat-
ing the protocol [41, § 2.1.4]: on a first step the Supplicant provides an empty
certificate list in the Certificate Verify message, an AS configured for privacy ac-
cepts the response and continues with the setup of the secure session. Then, on
a second step, the AS forces the Supplicant to run another TLS session setup,
over the one previously created, but now with a proper certificate list in the
Certificate Verify message. This strategy assumes that in the first step both
peers agree on a ciphersuite supporting confidentiality.
We considered two alternative, and more lightweight, strategies.
One possibility is to negotiate a ciphersuite supporting confidentiality and
use it to encrypt the certificate list provided in the TLS Certificate Verify mes-
sage. A candidate key could be derived from the master secret, by increasing the
length of key block that is used to derive all the required keys from the master
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key [41, § 2.3]. Note that the master key is derived from the pre-master key,
which is provided to the AS by the Supplicant before sending the Certificate
Verify message.
Another possibility is to use user pseudonyms in user certificates, which
could be renewed for each new user certificate.
In the case that no other mechanisms are in place for preventing device
tracking, such as the modification of the MAC address of the 802.11 network
interface on each network association, the best strategy is the last one, the use
of pseudonyms, since they do not add any extra information to the one already
gathered using only the MAC address. Otherwise, the best strategies are the
first two, since they both completely hide the details of the user certificate.
5.5 Certificates, certification hierarchies and CSR’s
The trust anchor of the whole EAP-SH process is the certificate of the AS of the
hotspot provider. This certificate must be trusted by the Supplicants, directly
or indirectly (by trusting some other certificate up on its certification chain,
such as a certification root).
Note that Captive Portals do not need to have any certificate, because
browsers do not interact directly with them. Browsers interact with the Sup-
plicant, which interacts with the AS, which interacts with the Captive Portal.
Thus, as long as the Supplicant trusts the AS certificate, the dialog between
the browser and the right Captive Portal is assured. Also note that the entire
dialog between the browser and the Captive Portal is open to inspection by the
Supplicant and the AS, but encrypted while in transit between them. A second
level of security between the browser and the Web server cannot be added as
the AS partially processes HTTP messages.
Regarding the user certificates, these may be generated by some private
Certification Authority (CA) known only by the AS, since only the AS needs
to validate them. Thus, the UCA does not need to be inserted in some public
certification hierarchy, it can certify itself, since for all that matters only the AS
needs to trust on its certification public key.
The actual approach for implementing pseudonyms in users’ certificates de-
pends solely on the server side, thus they can be defined by the hotspot network
providers. From our point of view, two strategies can be followed.
One strategy consists in having an extra column in the AS users’ database
with the pseudonyms. Pseudonyms may be random sequences generated by the
AS upon a successful user authentication by the Captive Portal. In this case, all
the AS has to do is to generate a pseudonym once it sees an X-username HTTP
header attribute in a Captive Portal reply, insert the pseudonym in the user’s
database record and replace the value of the HTTP attribute by the pseudonym.
Since the Supplicant generates a CSR with whatever comes in the X-username
attribute, it will use the pseudonym transparently.
Another strategy consists in doing the same, but using a pseudonym com-
puted by some encryption performed internally by the AS. In this case, the
users’ database does not need to have any extra column, since the AS can get
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the correct user identity by decrypting the user pseudonym. Different pseudo-
nyms for the same user can be easily achieved by using some random data in
the encryption process (e.g. encrypting with a secret key and a random Ini-
tialization Vector (IV) or encrypting with the AS public key with PKCS #1 or
OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) paddings [22]).
For coping with any identity value provided by an AS, assuming that it is
provided as a ASCII string, a Supplicant can simply use it as the Common
Name in the Subject field of a CSR.
5.6 Dialog with the Captive Portal
The dialog between a user and a Captive Portal uses a browser, as usually.
However, the browser is automatically launched by the Supplicant application
only when necessary, i.e., when the authentication cannot be performed using
asymmetric credentials. A simplified, or a more secure browser, can be used if
necessary, and this is decided by the client or the Supplicant provider.
The browser connection is directed to a local URI, i.e., to the localhost
Internet address and to a TCP port allocated by the Supplicant application.
This port receives the HTTP traffic produced by the browser, which is then
forwarded to the Captive Portal through the AS, which also establishes a TCP
connection with the Captive Portal for that purpose. The reverse path of that
HTTP traffic is treated similarly: the AS receives the responses from the Captive
Portal, forwards them to the Supplicant, and this forwards them again to the
browser. Therefore, the objects in the Web page (e.g. CSS, JavaScript, images)
should be added by taking in consideration that resources are available to the
browser at the localhost, and not at the Web server IP address.
The browser does not need to authenticate the Captive Portal, as in other
solutions using Captive Portals. In fact, the network provider authentication is
tackled in the establishment of the TLS tunnel, thereafter all the dialog between
a browser and the Captive Portal is guaranteed to be performed with the correct
entity because it goes through the TLS tunnel.
5.6.1 Password management issues
Our transparent proxying between the user browser and the Captive Portal
raises some issues related with the storage of login credentials by browsers’
password managers. Today, and unless configured otherwise, browsers are ex-
tremely effective in helping users to memorize login credentials, usually spotted
when HTML forms use an input field with the password type.
Browsers’ password managers memorize login credentials associated to the
URL portion that provides the service endpoint, i.e., its host name (or IP ad-
dress) and TCP port. However, in our case we cannot guaranty that the Sup-
plicant always uses the same TCP port to handle browsers’ dialogues, unless a
specific port could be allocated by IANA1. Furthermore, even if using the exact
1Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, http://www.iana.org
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same port, the constancy of the IP address (localhost) would merge creden-
tials for different EAP-SH hotspots under the same memory record, in which
case it may create problems if using the same username across different hotspot
providers.
Concluding, it should not be easy to use browser’s password managers to
memorize users’ credentials for accessing EAP-SH Captive Portals. The obvious
option is, then, not to use such managers, and always input the login credentials
in Captive Portals’ interfaces. The non-memorization of credentials can be
forced by Captive Portals, but this requires replacing simple and straightforward
login HTML forms by JavaScript code capable of doing the same (as we did in
our implementation, see Section 6.3). If such non-memorization is not forced,
users must voluntarily reject the memorization of credentials each time they log
in a Captive Portal, unless the browser provides some permanent disabling of
that (which is only effective if the same local URL is presented to the browser).
5.7 Validation of the AS certificate
Usually certificates provided by servers, such as the AS, are validated by the
Supplicant using certification hierarchies and certificate revocations. However,
for checking certificate revocations one cannot resort to OCSP (Online Certifi-
cates Status Protocol [38]) servers, because the Supplicant at this point cannot
use IP communications, and it is not practical to use Certificates Revocation
Lists, because that would imply a pre-caching of all the required lists before
performing a first connection with the AS.
The solution for this problem is to use the so-called OCSP stapling mecha-
nism [11]. A TLS client may require, on its initial Hello message, the provision-
ing by the server of a signed OCSP message with the current revocation status
of the server’s certification chain. When the client appends to its Hello message
a Certificate Status Request, the server sends, along with its certificate, a status
field with an up-to-date OCSP response. This response allows the Supplicant
to validate the server’s certificate without having to initiate connections with
OCSP servers.
6 Prototype Implementation
For evaluating the suitability of EAP-SH we implemented it using existing open-
source applications for Linux systems. For the Supplicant we modified the
wpa supplicant application; for the AS we modified a freeRADIUS server.
Regarding the UCA and the related certification services, we used a private
PKI managed with calls to the openssl application. This application was also
used by the Supplicant to create a CSR and by the AS (on behalf of a UCA) to
issue a user certificate from a CSR.
Finally, the Captive Portal was implemented with a CherryPy2 Web server.
2http://cherrypy.org
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This prototype was successfully used to perform consecutive logins with a
Linux client host.
6.1 Supplicant
On Linux, the 802.1X Supplicant is played by a daemon that controls the 802.11
wireless networking, called wpa supplicant, which supports a wide variety of
EAP methods 3. Each EAP method is implemented as a separated module and
all EAP methods use the same interface between the supplicant state machine
and method-specific functions. Method registration is done through this inter-
face. This allows new EAP methods to be added without modifying the core
EAP state machine implementation.
Regarding this core implementation, all we had to do was to add a new EAP
type number to the set of EAP type definitions. As of today, numbers 56 to 191
are unassigned 4, therefore we assigned to EAP-SH the type number 56.
As shown before, our EAP-SH incorporates an EAP-TLS phase, similarly to
PEAP or EAP-TTLS [14]. For that reason, we adapted the wpa supplicant’s
PEAP module, which also uses TLS on a 1st stage, for implementing EAP-SH.
The TLS component of wpa supplicant is generic enough to be used alone or
combined with other EAP methods. Namely, it supports client authentication
(used by EAP-TLS) or is able to proceed without it. This was a perfect match
for our EAP-SH.
6.1.1 Configuration
The wpa supplicant configuration is given by a text file (usually
wpa_supplicant.conf) that lists all accepted networks and their security poli-
cies. It can include one or more network definition blocks, which include the
entire necessary configuration for those networks.
For EAP-SH, the network block comprises a number of fields that contain
critical information used when authenticating to a network, which are the fol-
lowing:
• ssid: Sequence of characters that uniquely identify a WLAN;
• key_mgmt: Accepted authenticated key management protocol (WPA-EAP
for EAP-SH);
• eap: EAP method used when authenticating to this network ({\EAPSH},
in our case);
• ca_path: path of the directory containing CA certificates files to validate
the network’s AS certificate;
3https://linux.die.net/man/8/wpa_supplicant
4http://www.iana.org/assignments/eap-numbers/eap-numbers.xhtml
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• client_cert and private_key: Paths to the client’s certificate file and
corresponding private key file, respectively. The contents of these files, if
valid, are used in the 1st phase of EAP-SH; every complete run of its 2nd
phase updates their contents.
• private_key_password: The password used to protect the user private
key used in the 1st phase of EAP-SH.
• browser_command: The command to launch a browser to interact with
the Captive Portal (through a local socket owned by wpa supplicant). We
used the firefox -new-window %s command to launch the browser with
a given URL, which would replace the parameter string %s.
Unlike for similar configurations, the user does not need to specify the ocsp
field for requiring OCSP stapling, as EAP-SH does that by default.
6.1.2 EAP-SH module on wpa supplicant
This module starts by instantiating a TLS tunnel, using or not the user au-
thentication with asymmetric credentials. At the end of this step the AS sends
an EAP message stating whether or not the user was authenticated during the
setup of the TLS tunnel. This message has an empty payload; the information
is solely coded in its S flag bit. If set, the wpa supplicant proceeds to the 2nd
phase; otherwise, it terminates successfully.
For the 2nd phase, the wpa supplicant starts by allocating a socket and
binding it to a random, local TCP endpoint (i.e., with an 127.X.X.X IP address
and a port between 1025 and 65535). Then, it launches the user browser (as
configured by the user) for accessing the URL constituted by the random TCP
endpoint.
Upon this initial setup, the wpa supplicant enters the following processing
cycle:
1. Read a full HTTP request from its TCP endpoint;
2. Transform the HTTP request into a TLS encrypted message and store it
on one or more EAP-SH messages with the H bit set;
3. Send the EAP-SH message to the AS;
4. Receive EAP-SH messages with the H bit set from the tunnel, combine
them until having a complete HTTP response, and send it to the TCP
endpoint.
5. Search for an X-username field in the header of the HTTP response. If
present, terminate this cycle and shutdown the TCP endpoint.
Once knowing the user pseudonym that should be used in their certificate,
the wpa supplicant proceeds to create a new RSA key pair and a corresponding
CSR. Then, the wpa supplicant encapsulates the CSR on a TLS message, stores
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[ req ]
prompt=no
default_keyfile = "provided in the user ’s conf file"
output_password = "provided in the user ’s conf file"
default_bits = 1024
default_md = sha256
distinguished_name = DN
[ DN ]
CN = "pseudonym provided by the AS"
Figure 5: Configuration file provided to openssl to generate a user’s CSR. Part of
its contents are filled with data collected from the wpa supplicant configuration
file
it on one or more EAP-SH messages with the C bit set and sends them to the
AS.
Finally, the wpa supplicant waits for a final EAP-SH message from the AS,
which must contain the user’s public key certificate. It stores the certificate in
a file with the path given by the configuration file and starts the whole process
again, this time in the hope of terminating at the end of phase 1.
For this second round of EAP-SH, the TLS tunnel must be recreated from
scratch, i.e., the previous TLS session cannot be reused. This is required to
force the client authentication, which cannot take place when a TLS session is
resumed.
6.1.3 CSR generation
The CSR is generated with the openssl tool, using a configuration file created
by wpa supplicant. The contents of that file are dynamic (i.e. the file does not
need to pre-exist) and presented in Figure 5. The Subject’s Common Name is
filled with the identity provided by the AS, interpreted as an ASCII string. The
key pair used in the CSR is always a new one, with 1024 bits.
6.2 RADIUS server
The authentication server was implemented by a modified RADIUS server. RA-
DIUS [35] is a protocol that provides centralized Authentication, Authorization
and Accounting management for users that connect and intend to use a network
service. We decided to modify FreeRADIUS5, a popular open source RADIUS
server, to implement the AS component of EAP-SH.
Similarly to wpa supplicant, adding EAP-SH to freeRADIUS implied cre-
ating a set of C files implementing the EAP interface methods (such as
instantiate and process), and the protocol’s logic. As for wpa supplicant,
we adapted the freeRADIUS’s PEAP modules to implement EAP-SH.
5http://freeradius.org/
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6.2.1 HTTP handling and pseudonym generation
HTTP requests, once defragmented from EAP messages, are sent to the Captive
Portal using a new socket connection. Then, the EAP-SH module waits for the
HTTP response and, once complete, searches its header for the X-username
field.
If present, it encrypts its value with AES-128 in CBC mode with PKCS #7
padding and a random IV. Then, the IV is concatenated with the resulting
cryptogram, is authenticated with an HMAC [18] computed with SHA-1 [12]
and the result is encoded in Base64, yielding the user’s pseudonym:
c = AES-128-CBC (K, IV, identity ‖PKCS #7 padding)
pseudonym = Base64 (IV ‖ c ‖HMAC (SHA-1,K, IV ‖ c))
where K is the encryption and authorization key and ‖ denotes concatenation.
The random IV assures that different pseudonyms will be generated for the same
identity on different occasions.
The same key is used to encrypt the username and check for the integrity
of a pseudonym. In our implementation, this key is volatile and generated each
time the AS is launched. The consequence of its loss upon a server restart is
that users need to fetch a new certificate, thus need to be authenticated by the
Captive Portal.
The pseudonym is then used to replace the former value of the X-username
field. Finally, the pseudonym is stored is a short term, volatile cache, for vali-
dating subsequent certification requests.
The pseudonym on a user certificate can be decrypted upon a successful 1st
phase of EAP-SH, yielding the real username. This username can them be used
for other operations, such as logging or authorization. We did not implement
them in our prototype.
6.2.2 CSR handling
When a CSR is received, its Subject’s Common Name is fetched from it and
checked against the pseudonyms cache. If present and still fresh (we used a
1-minute time window), the CSR is used to generate a new user’s certificate.
To simplify the implementation for the proof of concept, the EAP-SH mod-
ule also acts as a UCA. This actual certificate generation is performed by a shell
script launched by the EAP-SH module, which uses the openssl command. All
this command’s parameters, such as the validity period of the users’ certificates,
are defined by this script. By using a script file, we are able to tune the parame-
ters used in the certification process without having to change the freeRADIUS
source code nor to add all the certification options to freeRADIUS configuration
files.
6.2.3 Certificates and certification chains
For this prototype, we implemented a very simple PKI, formed by a root CA
and an intermediate CA. The intermediate CA was used to issue the certificate
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used by the EAP-SH module of RADIUS server and to issue client’s certificates,
upon reception of their CSR. To manage all the aspects of this PKI we also used
openssl.
6.2.4 EAP-SH module configuration
In order to integrate our protocol, the freeRADIUS EAP modules configuration
file was changed accordingly. This file is parsed by the EAP-SH module upon
its initialization and its contents are the following:
• certificate_file: file with the AS certificate and certification chain;
• private_key_file: file with the AS private key;
• private_key_password: password to decrypt the private key file;
• ca_file: server CA file, for validating Supplicants’ certificates;
• user_cerficate_issuing_script: shell script used to issue a user cer-
tificate;
• captive_portal_endpoint: the IP address and TCP port of the Captive
Portal HTTP server.
6.3 Captive Portal
This server was implemented with a CherryPy Web server, implementing a
very simple authentication page based on a username and a password. Its user
database was implemented with SQLite6.
The login page uses an HTML form that was designed with the goal of pre-
venting browsers from memorizing users’ credentials. Empirically we found out
that browsers are extremely effective in such memorization, which is triggered
by the presence of an input field of type password.
Therefore, we replaced the password input type by text and used some
extra JavaScript event handlers to hide the password, character by character,
immediately after its input (see Figure 6). The original password characters are
saved in a variable, which is copied (without any hashing) into a hidden form
field when the latter is submitted. With this approach, we managed to disable
the storage of user’s passwords by the browsers’ password manager while hiding
the password typed from shoulder surfers.
The fact of not using a form input field of type password has another inter-
esting side effect. Usually browsers warn users when they fill credential forms
belonging to HTTP resources, because those forms will be exposed in the net-
work on their submission. The way browsers detect the input of sensitive data,
such as credentials, in forms is by the presence of fields of type password. Thus,
because we did not use this field type, for the reasons presented above, we also
6https://www.sqlite.org
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avoid useless browser warnings (because, in our case, the browser session con-
nects to a local port that forwards the HTTP traffic to a Captive Portal over a
TLS tunnel; therefore, there is no risk).
If, in the future, browsers start imposing HTTPS-only access, there are two
possible solutions: one is to disable (or not to implement at all) this feature for
traffic that is internal to the machine; a second one is to provide an HTTPS
endpoint on the Supplicant, using a certificate belonging to a certification chain
used only internally. Naturally, the root of that certification chain would have
to belong to the list of trusted roots used by local browsers.
<script>
var psw = ”” ;
var s t a r = ”” ;
func t i on hide ( ) {
var v = document . getElementById ( ”psw” ) . va lue ;
i f ( v . l ength < s t a r . l ength ) {
psw = psw . sub s t r i ng (0 , v . length −1);
s t a r = s t a r . sub s t r i ng (0 , v . length −1);
} e l s e {
s t a r += ”∗” ;
v = document . getElementById ( ”psw” ) . value ;
psw += v . s l i c e (−1);
}
document . getElementById ( ”psw” ) . value = sta r ;
}
f unc t i on unhide ( ) {
document . getElementById ( ”hpsw” ) . value = psw ;
}
</script>
<form onsubmit=unhide ( ) action=”/ l o g i n ”
method=post>
<input type=”hidden” name=”hpsw” id=”hpsw”
autocomplete=” o f f ”>
Username<br>
<input type=” text ” name=”uname” requ i r ed
autocomplete=” o f f ”><br>
Password<br>
<input type=” text ” name=”psw” id=”psw” requ i r ed
autocomplete=” o f f ” oninput=hide ( )><br>
<button type=”submit”>Login</button>
</form>
Figure 6: HTML login form, with JavaScript event handlers to save and hide
the password as it is typed and to provide the saved password (without any
post-processing, such as hashing) when the form is submitted (in its hidden
input field “hpsw”).
7 Performance evaluation
The performance of our solution depends on many technical aspects, many of
them highly variable, such as the performance of the machines involved, the
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performance of the communications and the cost of the (asymmetric) crypto-
graphic operations involved. In addition, it depends on the specific interaction
with a Captive Portal and on pauses due to the required human-machine inter-
action. Therefore, we decided not to evaluate the performance of our solution
in absolute terms, but rather to compare it theoretically with similar solutions.
The first time a user enters a hotspot network they need to run the com-
plete protocol displayed on Figure 3. The first and the second phases, together,
are similar to the actual authentication with a Captive Portal. In fact, Cap-
tive Portal authentications typically run over an HTTPS session (to protect
the confidentiality of the credentials entered by users). Thus, our (initial) 1st
phase is similar to the set-up of a TLS session within an HTTPS interaction,
and our 2nd phase is similar to the HTTP interaction with a Captive Portal
that runs within HTTPS. In both cases, the only differences are the EAP and
RADIUS encapsulation displayed in Figure 2 (which add a small overhead on
the exchanged data), and the generation and exchange of the CSR and user
certificate at the end of the second phase.
For users that already have the asymmetric credentials fetched with the
interactions previously referred, the authentications are equal to EAP-TLS (final
first phase in Figure 3). Since this is intended to be the most frequent case,
because the asymmetric credentials can be valid for some time (e.g. a day),
EAP-SH will most of the time be as efficient as EAP-TLS.
Concluding, the only relevant overhead introduced by EAP-SH, when com-
paring with the actual authentication protocols used in Wi-Fi networks (includ-
ing with Captive Portals), is the sporadic generation and exchange of a CSR
and the corresponding certificate. Just to illustrate how small can this over-
head be, both the generation of a CSR (with a new 1024-bit RSA key) and
the generation of a certificate (signed by a 2048-bit RSA key) take around 100
milliseconds each in a Windows 10 host with an Intel core i7-8550U processor.
8 Security and Usability Analysis
With EAP-SH, the hotspot provider is authenticated with a certificate that
needs to be pre-configured by the Supplicant. This means that, once such
configuration has been done, the user does not need to pay attention to such
action again (except if the certificate changes). This is not the case with the
current Captive Portal authentication, where a user needs to pay attention to
the effective security of every HTTPS session established with each Captive
Portal.
The import of the hotspot certificate for the client hosts is, therefore, a
critical task. Today this can be done in many different ways. For instance,
the certificate may be downloaded from a secure Web page, using an existing
network access, prior to use a hotspot (e.g. using a cellular interface). Alter-
natively, the certificate can be decoded from a QR code image displayed in a
secure place (e.g. painted in the wall of a cybercafe), or downloaded from a dis-
tribution device using a wireless communication technology immune to MitM
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attacks (e.g. NFC, as in [21]). In short, there are numerous secure ways to
convey the hotspot certificate to its clients, but the discussion of their relative
benefits is out of the scope of this paper. For what concerns us, this is not a
complex problem to solve.
Although not previously referred, the EAP-SH paradigm can help users to
identify when they are accessing a Captive Portal with it. In fact, the EAP-SH
Supplicant software has access to the HTML contents provided by a Captive
Portal, and can easily manipulate them in order to add to it some personal,
visual content available only locally and customized by users. This way, a rogue
Captive Portal Web page could not impersonate thz ones effective observed by
each user for all EAP-SH based Captive Portals.
The EAP-SH approach extends the 802.1X paradigm. This means that it en-
ables a secure interaction between the Supplicant and the AP upon a successful
authentication between the Supplicant and the AS. This fact rules out some of
the already referred attacks, such as session hijacking or freeloading [48] or DNS
poisoning [2]. This is not possible with the current Captive Portal approach,
where the wireless communication is never protected at the link layer.
The EAP-SH protects the hotspot provider from attacks deployed by non-
authenticated users. With the current Captive Portal paradigm, client hosts
need to configure their network layer (get an IP address and a netmask), for
which they need to run a DHCP negotiation. Many times, they are even allowed
to perform DNS queries, which enables them to contact networks beyond the
one of the hotspot provider (using, for instance, DNS tunnels [27]). All these
possibilities represent a security risk, since such services can be abused and there
is no way to identify the responsible person. On the contrary, with EAP-SH the
client host does not have IP access to the network until successfully finishing its
802.1X authentication.
The CSR created by the Supplicant uses a user name (or pseudonym) that
was given to the Supplicant and that is known by the AS. Therefore, a malicious
Supplicant, once passed the Captive Portal authentication, cannot impersonate
other users by using their pseudonym. This check is done when the AS receives
the CSR, before forwarding it to the UCA.
9 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we proposed a new EAP protocol, EAP-SH, which is able to
merge two authentication paradigms: the one using Captive Portals and the
one of 802.1X. The first is useful for enrolling new clients by a hotspot provider,
and the second is able to provide security to the Wi-Fi link between a client
host and the hotspot AP. The current Captive Portal paradigm is a hack that
requires a special support by the APs and does not provide any security on the
wireless link. On the contrary, EAP-SH, combined with 802.1X, requires the
modification of the Supplicant and AS systems, but works with all existing APs
that support the 802.1X enterprise mode, which is common nowadays.
23
EAP-SH not only provides support for a Captive Portal authentication but
it also enables client hosts to authenticate consecutively in the hotspot net-
work without requiring users to provide authentication credentials (usually a
username and password pair). This is achieved with the just in time issuing
of client certificates, which may be cached by client hosts and used during the
certificates’ lifetime. The only drawback of our approach is the fact that users
are not able to memorize their Captive Portal’s credentials using the browsers’
password management facilities, since there is no way to associate the right
credentials to each hotspot provider. Nevertheless, the possibility of using the
certificates to authenticate eases this problem, since the number of required
Captive Portal authentications is reduced.
In terms of added security, EAP-SH clearly outperforms the current Captive
Portal paradigm. Client hosts cannot use IP networking prior to complete their
authentication, thus they are not able to use the network before completing
their authentication. Hotspot providers can be authenticated with certificates
associated with EAP-SH profiles, thus users are more protected from attacks by
rogue hotspot providers. Finally, the wireless link between the client host and
the hotspot AP is secured (encrypted and authenticated with 802.11i protocols)
upon a successful authentication.
A prototype of EAP-SH was implemented in two Linux tools that imple-
ment the Supplicant and the AS of an 802.1X architecture: wpa supplicant and
freeRADIUS. This prototype was successfully tested with a simple password-
based Captive Portal, which was designed for avoiding clients’ browsers to use
their password manager to store users’ credentials.
As future work, we can foresee several lines of action. A first one is to pursue
the standardization of EAP-SH in the form of an IETF RFC. A second one
is a closer integration of the Supplicant software with a browser for enabling
the memorization of users’ passwords by the browsers’ password manager, a
facility that is used by many users. Finally, a third one, also related with that
closer integration, the presentation of a custom user interface provided by the
Supplicant (e.g. a background image) to assure users that they are interacting
with a given hotspot provider when they are called to provide their credentials
to a Captive Portal.
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